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Arbitrator Decision on Making: Whenare Final Offers Important?
ABSTRACT
Central to understanding the effect of arbitration schemes on the
process of collective bargaining is understanding Lhe process by which
arbitrators make decisions. A model of arbitrator behavior in
conventional arbitration is developed that allows the arbitration
award to be a function of both the offers of the parties and the
(exogenous) facts of the case. The weight that the arbitrator puts on
the facts relative to the offers is hypothesized to be a function of
the quality of the offers as measured by the difference between the
offers. Two special cases of this model are derived: 1) the
arbitrator bases the award strictly on the offers of the parties
(split—the—difference) and 2) the arbitrator bases the award strictly
on the facts of the case.
The model is implemented empirically using data gathered from
practicing arbitrators regarding their decisions in twenty-five
hypothetical cases. These data have the advantage that they allow
causal inference regarding the effect on the arbitration award of the
facts relative to the offers. On the basis of the estimates, both of
the special case models are strongly rejected. The arbitration awards
are found to be influenced by both the offers of the parties and the
facts of the case. In addition, the weight put on the facts of the
case relative to the offers is found to vary significantly with the
quality of the offers. When the offers are of low quality (far apart)
the arbitrator weights the facts more heavily and the offers less
heavily.
These results suggest that the naive split-the difference view of
arbitrator behavior, which is the basis of the critique of
conventional arbitration that has led to the adoption of final—offer
arbitration, is no correct in its extreme view. On the other hand,
the awards are affected by the offers so that the parties can
manipulate the outcome to some extent by manipulating their offers.
However, the scope for this sort of influence is limited by the
finding that the offers are weighted less heavily as their quality
deteriorates.
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Of central importance In the process of collective bargaining is
the mechanism for settling disputes that arise when theparties fail
to reach agreement. It determines not only the terms ofagreement in
all cases but also the probability of reaching agreement without
resort to the dispute settlement mechanism. While the strike is the
dominant mode for settling disputes that arise in the course of
negotiating labor contracts, arbitration procedures have become
particularly important in areas, such as the public sector, where
strikes are not allowed. These procedures are characterized bya
third party making a binding decision.
The willingness of the parties to make concessions in order to
reach a negotiated settlement is based largely on what they expect to
receive if they do not reach agreement. In the case of arbitration,
the parties' expectations regarding the outcome in the event of
failure to reach a negotiated settlement depend heavily on their
expectations regarding the behavior of the arbitrator. Thus, our
ability to understand the effects of an arbitration scheme on the
collective bargaining process without understanding the decision
processes of the arbitrators themselves is quite limited. However,
there has been little in the way of systematic analysis of how
arbitrators actually decide.1
In this study the decision process of arbitrators in a
conventional arbitration scheme, where arbitrators are free to impose
any settlement they see fit, is analyzed. While the use of this type
of arbitration has been increasing, critics have identified a number
of potentially troublesome implications for the bargaining process.22
The most important of these is the possibilitythat the arbitrator
will "split the difference" between the offersof the parties
resulting in a "chilling" of bargainingand excess'ive reliance on the
arbitrator to reach agreement.3 This may occur asthe parties
maintain polar positions in order to influencethe arbitration award
most favorably.
In order to evaluate this argument aswell as to investigate the
arbitration process more generally, a model ofarbitrator behavior is
built that nests two extreme views of the process.The first is the
view that arbitrators simply split thedifference between the offers
of the parties untainted by the facts ofthe case04 The second is the
naive view that arbitrators examine the factsof a case and impose a
settlement that is deemed fair untainted bythe offers of the
parties.5 The empirical implementationof this model will shed light
on the extent to which thearbitrator splits—the—difference as opposed
to fashioning an award based onthe facts of the case.
In order to implement this model empiricallyit is necessary to
collect data on the decisions of arbitrators.However, data on
arbitrators' decisions in actual cases ofthe sort generally analyzed
have serious limitations. Considerthe case where the investigator is
forced to rely on decisions in actual casesin making inferences
regarding the degree to which thearbitrator is influenced by the
offers of the parties in formulating anaward. It is certainly true
that the offers of the parties areaffected by all of the facts of the
particular case and that theinvestigator is not able to observeall
of the facts. Thus, simply findingthat the arbitrator's decision is
related to the offers of the partiesafter controlling for the3
observed facts is not sufficient to conclude that the arbitrator is,
in fact, influenced by the offers of the parties. It may be that any
relationship, between the arbitration award and the offers of the
parties is a statistical artifact of omitted unobserved facts of the
case, themselves correlated with the offers of the parties, that are
observed by the arbitrator and utilized directly in fashioning an
award. Thus, it is impossible to infer causality regarding the direct
effect of the offers on the behavior of the arbitrator from data on
the decisions of arbitrators in actual cases.
In light of these problems, the nested model is implemented
empirically using data gathered from practicing arbitrators who were
each asked to decide the same set of twenty-five hypothetical cases.
In the simulation exercise used here, •the arbitrators were given a
precisely controlled set of information regarding the facts of each
case along with information regarding the offers of the parties. All
of the variation in the facts is measured in the data. Thus, the
information set of the arbitrator is completely characterized by the
observed facts of the case, and the offers of the parties cannot be
proxying for factors that the arbitrator observes but are not observed
by the investigator. Any effect of the offers of the parties. on the
arbitration award that is found using data from the simulation
exercise after controlling for the facts ofthecase can properly be
interpreted causally as the "pure" effect of' the offers.
In the next section the model of the arbitrator's decision
process is developed in detail. The model allows both the facts of
the particular case and the offers of the parties to have an effect on
the outcome. The model is generalized so that the weight that the4
arbitrator puts on the facts of the case relative to the weight put on
the offers of the parties is a systematic function of the "quality'
(reasonableness) of the offers. More specifically, the weight that
the arbitrator puts on the facts of the case is argued to be a direct
function of the difference between the offers. Thus, when the parties
are near agreement (offers close together), the arbitrator has little
discretion in making an award. The aribtrator simply ratifies what
the parties have nearly agreed upon. On the other hand, when the
parties are far from agreement (offers far apart), the arbitrator has
a considerable degree of latitude in making an award, and the facts of
the case have an important influence.
Four special cases of the general model are derived. The first
is where the arbitrator considers only the facts of the case. The
second is where the arbitratorsimply splits the difference between
the offers of the parties. The third is a slight generalization of
the second where the arbitrator compromises between the offers of the
parties but where the offers are weighted unequally in forming a
compromise. The final special case is where the arbitrator considers
a fixed weight combination of the facts of the case and the offersof
the parties in formulating an award.
In section III the design of the simulation exercise is discussed
and the resulting sample is described. Section IV contains the
empirical specification of the models of arbitrator choice. In
section V the models are estimated using the data from the simulated
arbitrations. It is found that all four of the special cases can be
rejected easily in favor of the model where the arbitratorconsiders
both the facts of the case and the offers of the parties and where the5
relative weights put on these factors arestrongly influenced by the
quality of the parties' offers. The final section containsa summary
and analysis of the results.
II. A Model of Arbitrator Behavior
Consider an arbitrator who must make a decisionregarding a
single issue such as the wage change to prevail in a collective
bargaining agreement.6 An idealized model of the determination by
arbitrators of an award in a particular case is that they examine the
facts of the case, use these to determine an appropriatesettlement,
and impose this judgement as the award.7 In more formalterms,
(1)
where Y represents the arbitration award and 1'e represents the
arbitrator's notion of an appropriate settlement based on the facts of
the case.
Another idealized model of the determination by arbitrators of an
award in a particular case is that they split the difference between
the offers of the parties. In more formal terms this is
(2) (m +
wherem represesents the offer of the management and Y,, represents
the offer of the union. A more general version of this model is that
the arbitrator is "biased" in the sense that the offers of the parties
are not weighted equally, although the award is still based on the
final offers exclusively. This can be expressed as
(3) dYm +(1d)Y
where d is a parameter between zero and one that represents the
relative weight put on the managements' offer.8
These idealized models all are inadequate. Consider first the6
model embodied in equation 1. To argue that arbitrators ignore the
offers of the parties and impose what they feel is appropriate based
strictly on the facts of the case disregards a large literature which
suggests that arbitrators place a great deal of emphasis on the offers
of the parties.9 There are a number of reasons why arbitrators would
consider the offers of the parties. First, they may be concerned that
the settlement imposed on the parties is acceptable to both parties so
that it is workable and contributes to the long run stability of the
collective bargaining relationship. One way to ensure the workability
of an award is to consider the explicit demands of the parties.1° A
second reason why the arbitrator might consider the offers of the
parties is that they may contain information about the facts of the
case that cannot be conveyed directly to the arbitrator in any other
fashion. However, the potential usefulness of the offers of the
parties to transmit information to the arbitrator will be undermined
by the desire of the parties to manipulate the award through
manipulation of their offers. In other words, the arbitrator will not
be able to determine whether a position taken by one of the parties
represents real information or strategic behavior by the party in
question. A final reason why the arbitrators might consider the
offers of the parties is that they have an obvious desire to be called
upon in the future, and one way to do this would be to consider the
explicit demands of the parties.11
It is also foolish to argue, as the models in equations 2 and 3
suggest, that arbitrators ignore the facts of a case and focus
exclusively on the offers of the parties. If this were true then the
parties would have the incentive to make their final Offers very7
extreme. An important factor in keeping the offers reasonable must be
that the aribtrator would judge extreme offers to be unreasonable and
put less weight on such offers.12 As a matter of 'logic it must be
true that in order to judge an offer to be reasonable or unreasonable
the arbitrator must have a standard against which to judge offers.
This standard is sure to be based on the facts of the case.
What is clearly required is a model which allows the arbitration
award to be a function of both the facts of the case and the offers of
the parties. A very simple model of this type is
(4) =gY+(1g)(dYm+(1—d)Y)
where the parameter g represents the weight that the arbitrators put
on their notion of what is appropriate (the facts) in formulating an
award. The quantity (1—g)d is the weight.that the arbitrators put on
the management's offer while (1-g)(1—d) is the weight that arbitrators
put on the union's position.
The earlier models are all special cases of this model. The
model embodied in equation 1 (only the facts matter) is the special
case where g=1, the model embodied in equation 2 (the pure split-the-
difference model) is the special case where g=O and d=1/2, and the
model embodied in equation 3 (general split the difference model) is
the special case where g=O. The general model will be estimated in
section V along with the special cases both in order to test the
validity of the special cases and in order to estimate the weights
placed on the facts of the case and the offers of the parties.
There is still a serious problem with even the general
specification contained in equation 4. This is that the weight (g)
that arbitrators puts on their own interpretation of the facts is8
assumed to be unaffected by either the facts or the offers of the
parties. Once again, the parties will have the incentive to make
their offers as extreme as possible. This is clear from equation 4,
where an increase (decrease) in the offer of either party increases
(decreases) the arbitration award. A more realistic model would allow
for the weights to vary with the quality of the offers of the parties.
One mechanism by which these weights could vary is that
arbitrators ought to have more flexibility in fashioning an award when
the offers of the parties are far apart than when they are close
together. The crux of this argument is that arbitrators are
attempting to fashion an acceptable and fair award. In order to do
this they may feel free to interpret the facts of the case in their
own way when the parties are far from agreement, but when the parties
are close to agreeing on the basis of their offers they will not want
to stray far from the nearly agreed upon settlement.13
Another interpretation of this mechanism for variation of the
weights is that as the the offers of the parties become more extreme
(less reasonable) the arbitrator ought to weight them less in
fashioning an award. This embodies the solution to the problem of why
the positions of the parties do not diverge to extreme values: As the
offers diverge, the arbitrator recognizes that they are unreasonable
in light of the facts and at least partly disregards them.
In the context of the model contained in equation 4, variable
weights can be introduced in a rather straightforward fashion. Let
(5) gf(Y —Ym)
where f is a monotonically increasing function of the difference
between the offers of the parties. In other words, the weight that9
the arbitrator puts on the facts of the case relative to the offers of
the parties is a direct function of how far apart the parties' offers
are. It also seems reasonable to expect that the function f has two
other properties. First, it ought to be true that f(O)=O so that if
the parties are in virtual agreement then the arbitrators essentially
ratify that agreement by putting no weight on their interpretation of
the facts. Second, it ought to be true that as the difference between
the offers of the parties grows very large the arbitrators essentially
disregard these offers and put full weight on their interpretation of
the facts (g=1).
It is interesting to note that this specification allows the
overall weight put on the offers (g) to vary without allowing the
relative weight put on the two offers (d) to vary. First, as the
offers of the parties diverge the arbitrator puts more weight on the
facts. This follows directly from the specification of the f
function. Second, as the offer of either party becomes extreme so
that it may be deemed unreasonable, the difference between the offers
will increase resulting in a decrease in the weight put on the offers
and an increase in reliance on the facts of the case. Thus, it is no
longer necessarily true that an increase (decrease) in either offer
will increase (decrease) the arbitration award. As will be
demonstrated later, the reduction in the weight put on the offers may
outweigh the increase (decrease) in the offers themselves.
It must be pointed out that there are many potential
specifications for a model embodying the mechanisms outlined above.
However, they all yield a similar set of empirical implications, and
the model specified here is rich enough to capture a wide range of10
potential variation in the data. Before turning to the empirical
implementation of the model, the sample of arbitrators and the
simulations used to generate the data are described in the next
section.
III. The Data
The data used in this study were collected from a set of
simulations administered to practicing arbitrators. The simulation
materials were sent out to the entire membership of the National
Academy of Arbitrators and the participants in a regional meeting of
the American Arbitration Association. Each arbitrator was asked to
judge twenty—five hypothetical interest arbitration cases where the
only remaining unresolved issue was wages. They were asked to provide
the wage award for a contract of one year duration that they would
make under a conventional arbitration scheme. Along with their
judgements in the twenty—five cases each arbitrator was asked to
supply information regarding his or her background and experience.
Arbitrators were required to supply their names and addresses with
their response only if they wished to receive a copy of the results.
Anonymity was guaranteed, and responses were sent back in a provided
business reply envelope.
Of 584 sets of materials mailed, fifty—nine arbitrators provided
usable responses for all twenty—five cases. The mean age of the
response group was 58.2 years, and allbut two of the respondents were
male.14 The mean number of interest arbitration cases that had been
heard by members of the response group was 128, while the the mean
number of arbitration cases of all sorts that had been heard was 988.11
While there is no way of knowing whether the response group is
representative of the population of arbitrators as a whole, it is
likely that those who responded were those who fe.t most comfortable
making an award on the basis of the information provided and who
believe that the salient features of a real collective bargaining
situation can be captured in a simulation. It is difficult to
speculate about the effect that this might have on the results.
Each of the twenty—five hypthetical cases was described in a
paragraph in terms of seven criterion factors. For each factor there
were five possible levels. In the total set of twenty-five cases
there were five cases for each of the five levels of each factor.
In order to maintain parallelism between cases while providing
necessary diversity, twenty-five industries were identified that had
varying average national wages. in 1980. These national wages were
adjusted very slightly to create a systematic pattern of twenty—five
national wages that varied from .40, .45, .50, ,.. 1.55,1.60 times
$8.66, where $8.66 was the mean of all twenty—five actual national
industry average wages.These adjusted national wages were used as a
basis for the computation of some of the factors as described below.
Along with information on the national wage, each scenario
contained information on seven factors.:
—Theinflation rate was stated to be 7%, 9%, 11%,13%, or 15%.
-Theaverage arbitrated wage increase of other contracts in the
industry was stated to be 6%, 8%, 10%, 12%, or 14%.
-Theaverage local wage for similarly qualified employees was
stated to be equal to the average national wage in the industry
times 87%, 94%, 101%, 108%, or 115%.12
—Thepresent wage was stated to be equal to the average national
wage times 96.5%, 98%, 99.5%, 101%, or 102.5%.
—Thefinancial health of the firm was stated to be terrible, poor,
fair, good, or excellent.
-Management'sfinal offer was stated to be equal to the average
national wage in the industry times 104%, 105.5%, 107%, 108.5%,
or 110%.
—Union'sfinal offer was stated to be equal to the average
national wage in the industry times 111.5%, 113%, 114.5%, 116%,
or 117.5%.
Two additional criteria were used in selecting the particular values
for each factor. First, it was desired that the scenarios develop
wage increases rather than wage declines.. Second,it was necessary
that for all scenarios the union's final offer exceed that of the
management for obvious reasons.
The scenarios were developed by pairing each of the five levels
of each factor once, and only once, with all five levels of each other
factor.15 Thus, the number of possible combinations of any two
factors is equal to five times five or twenty-five, which is equal to
the number of cases in the simulation. The following is an example of
a simulated case:
Situation 18
In a town of 102,000 people, workers with similar
skills and backgrounds to the employees of this radio and
broadcasting company were paid $8.31/hr., while the national
wage in this industry was $8.23/hr.The financial outlook
for this company is fair in light of the 11% inflation rate.
The present average wage for this company's union is
$8.44/hr. Contract negotiations havereached an impasse.
Both sides, however, have agreed to submit final offers to
you, the arbitrator, and to bebound by your decision for a
period of one year. Comparable pay increasesfrom13
collective bargaining agreements in the industry are running
about 8% this year. Management's final offer is $8.56 (a
1.4% increase) and the union's final offer is $9.55 (a 13.2%
increase).
As Table 1 shows, there is considerable variation in the
responses of the arbitrators within particular cases. The standard
deviation of the percent •wage increase awarded by the arbitrator in a
particular case is never below 1.1 percent and is generally much
larger. Thus, arbitrators differ substantially in their evaluation of
any particular scenario, and these differences may be a major source
of the uncertainty that has been argued to drive collective bargaining
where arbitration is the dispute settlement mechanism.16
The analysis contained in the next section will be based on the
proportional wage increase awarded by the arbitrators. This can be
approximated by the difference between the, logarithm of the wage level
awarded and the logarithm of the present wage.17 This will be called
here the log difference of the arbitrated wage from the present wage.
On this basis the relevant form for the explanatory variables that
measure wages are as log differences from the present wage. The only
variables that do not measure wages or proportional changes are the
variables measuring the financial condition of the company. Two
dichotomous variables were created to measure variation in this
dimension. The first (CONDB) equals one if the financial condition of
the firm was terrible or poor, and it equals zero otherwise. The
second (CONDG) equals one if the financial condition of the firm was
good or excellent, and it equals zero otherwise. The omitted catagory
is a firm financial condition of fair. The definitions, means, and
standard deviations of the variables used in the empirical analysis
are contained in Table 2.14
IV. The Empirical Specification
In order to implement the models of arbitrator choice outlined in
section II, a specification of the arbitrator's notion of an
appropriate settlement (e) is required. This must be based only on
the facts of the case and not on the offers of the parties. A
convenient specification for e IS
(6) XB
where X represents a vector of variables reflecting the facts and B
represents a vector of parameters. The vector X includes a constant
and variables measuring (1) the rate of inflation; (2) arbitration
awards in comparable situations; (3) the differential between the
local wage for comparable work and the present wage; (4) the
differential between the national wage in the industry and the present
wage; (5) the logarithm of the present wage; and (6) the financial
condition of the company. The definitions of these variables are
contained in Table 2
Assuming an additive error, equation 1, representing the model of
the arbitrator decision process where the arbitrator's notion of an
apprçpriate award is simply imposed, can be rewritten as
(7) Y5XB+e
where e represents unmeasured components affecting the arbitration
award. Under the same stochastic assumption, equations 2 and 3,
representing the constrained and unconstrained versions respectively,
of the split—the--difference model of the arbitrator decision process
are simply augmented by the additive error (e). The more general
model contained in equation 4 and embodying both of the simple models15
can be written with an additive error as
(8) =gXB+(1g)(dY+(1-d)Y)+e.
Each of the empirical models defined in thisparagraph can be
estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). Thegeneral model in
equation (8) is estimated by regressing Y5 on X and the offers of the
parties. It is clear from equation 8 that the sum of the coefficients
on the offers from the OLS regression is equal to 1—g and that the
ratio of the coefficient on the management offer from the OLS
regression to 1—g is equal to d. Thus, both the weight that, the
arbitrator puts on the interpretation of the facts of the case(g) and
the weight placed on the management offer relative to the union offer
(d) can be recovered in a straightforward fashion from the OLS
estimates.
The final model to be estimated allows the weight on the facts of
the case to vary with the quality of the offers. Thus, an empirical
specification is required for the weighting function (g =f(Y—
definedin equation 5. A convenient parameterization for this
function that has the required properties is
(9) g =1—EXP[g0+g1(Y—tm))
whereg0 and g represent the parameters of 'the function. This
parameterization is rich in allowing for testable empirical
hypotheses. Most importantly, the notion that the weight the
arbitrator puts on the notion of an appropriate award (the facts of
the case) is a direct function of how far apart the parties' offers
are is embodied in this specification as g1 <0.If g1 is not
significantly less than zero then the notion that the weights are
dependent on the quality of the offers cannot be rejected in the16
context of the empirical specification used here. In addition, the
hypothesis that the arbitrator have no discretion (g =0)in the case
where the the parties' offers are congruent Ym)is embodied in
the specification as the hypothesis that g0 =0.After substituting
equation 9 into equation 8 for g, the model can be estimated
straightforwardly by nonlinear least squares (NLLS), and each of these
hypotheses can be tested directly.
Before presenting the estimates, it is interesting to note that
the sample design seems to be a natural for application of an error
components model of some sort. There are twenty—five observations for
each of the arbitrators, and it is likely that the arbitrators differ
systematically in their awards across the twenty—five cases. If this
difference can be captured by differences in the intercept in the
appropriate award function (equation 6) then a fixed effect model
which allows for arbitrator specific dummy variables would be
appropriate.18 However, each arbitrator was given the same set of
twenty—five cases so that the explanatory variables (X, m,Y)are
the same for all arbitrators in each case. In this situation it can
be shown for the OLS models that the estimates derived without the
fixed effects are identical to those obtained when the fixed effects
are included.19 In addition, it can be shown that the standard errors
derived from the model including the fixed effects must be smaller
than those derived from the model without the fixed effects. Thus,
any hypothesis testing done on the basis of the OLS estimates without
the fixed effects will be conservative.
While these results are not precisely true for the NLLS model,
all of the results presented below and derived using NLJLS were17
reestimated including fixed arbitrator effects. The resultswere
virtually unchanged with respect to both theparameter estimates and
the estimated standard errors. With these considerationsin mind, the
analysis proceeds without an error components structure and with the
understanding that the results are identical to those that would be
obtained with such a structure.2°
V. The Empirical Results
Table 3 contains estimates of the OLS versions of the model.The
first column of the Table contains estimates of the model of
arbitrator decision making where the arbitrators simply award what
they feel is a fair settlement without considering the offers of the
parties. It is clear that the facts play a very important role in
determining the award, and with a few exceptions the results accord
with what one would expect. In general, higher inflation,higher
arbitrated settlements elsewhere, and higher relative earnings for
comparable workers (both national andlocal) all lead to a larger
proportional wage increase awarded by the arbitrator.
There are two somewhat unexpected results. First, the log level
of the present wage is significantly positively related to the
proportional wage increase awarded by the arbitrator, which suggests
where wages are already high the proportional increase awarded will be
larger. The result will be a wage structure with wage differentials
that are increasing over time. This will be examined further with
regard to the other models.
The second unexpected result is that the decrease in the award18
due to subpar company financial condition is estimated to be over
twice as large as the increase in the award due to a better than
average company financial condition. The hypothesis that the "reward"
(to the union) when the company is strong is of the same magnitude as
the "penalty" when the company is weak can be rejected at any
reasonable level of significance.21 This result is potentially very
important becuase it implies that, in situations where conventional
arbitration is the dispute settlement mechanism and where workers
settle for smaller wage increases because their employer is in
financial difficulty, they will not be able to recover fully their
concession when the firm is in good financial condition.
The second column of Table 3 contains estimates of the simple
split-the—difference model which contains only a constant and the
average of the final offers of the parties. While it is clear that
the average final offer is significantly correlated with the
arbitration award, it is also true that the constant is significantly
different from zero so that the pure split—the—difference model is
rejected. The third column of Table 3 contains the slightly more
general version of the split—the—difference model where the offers of
the two parties can have different effects on the outcome. Once again
the constant is significantly different from zero, but the striking
result is that the weight that the arbitrator puts on the management
final offer is estimated to be over twice as large as the weight that
the arbitrator puts on the union final offer. The hypothesis that the
weights are equal can be rejected at any reasonable level of
significance.22 Of course, this may well be due to the possiblity
that the arbitrators found the management final offer more reasonable,19
but this model can take no explicitaccount of the quality of the
offers.
The estimates contained in the fourth column,of Table 3 relateto
the model with the variables reflecting both the facts of thecase and
the offers of the parties included. It is clear that both classes of
variables contribute significant explanatorypower. The models
contained in the earlier columns of the table are nested in this
model, and both of the special case models can be rejected. The
hypothesis that arbitrators simply impose what they deem fair on the
basis of the facts of the case without reference to the offers of the
parties can be rejected at any reasonable level of significance.23 In
addition, the hypothesis that the arbitratorsbase their awards solely
on the offers of the parties without reference to the facts of the
case can be rejected at any reasonable level of significance.24
The substantive results are virtually unchanged from the simpler
models. The "penalty" for subpar company condition is significantly
larger than the "reward" for better than average company condition,
and the weight on the management offer is significantly larger than
the weight on the union offer. However, even this more general model
does not allow the relative weights placed on the offers of the
parties to vary with the quality of the offers so that the asymmetry
noted for the estirnabed weights may still be due to systematically
more reasonable (from the arbitrator's viewpoint) management offers.
One anomalous result from the earlier model at least partly
disappears. The level of the present wage is no longer a significant
(at conventional levels) determinant of the proportional wage increase
awarded by the arbitrator.20
It is straightforward to recover the coefficents of the
underlying components of the model (B,g,d) from the estimates
contained in the last column of Table 3 using the relationship defined
in equation 8 and assuming that g is a fixed parameter to be
estimated. This tranforiTtation of the estimates is containedin the
first column of Table 4. Isolated here are the determinants (XB)of
the arbitrator's notion of an appropriate award, the weight (g)that
the arbitrator puts on this notion, and the relative weight(d) that
the arbitrator puts on the positions of the parties.
This transformation of the results into the terms of theformal
structure contained in equation 8 highlights tworesults. First, the
weight that arbitrators put on their notionof an appropriate
settlement is estimated to be significantly greater than onehalf but
significantly less than one. This weight (g)is computed as one minus
the sum of the coefficients on the offers of the two parties,and it
is estimated to be .641 with a very small (.0355)standard error. The
second result, noted above, is that the weight thatthe arbitrator
puts on the management offer isestimated to be three times as large
as the weight put on the union offer.This weight (d) is computed as
the ratio of the coefficient on the managementoffer to the sum of the
coefficients on the two offers, and it is estimated tobe .753 with a
small (.055) standard error.
To this point the weight that the arbitrators puton their notion
of an appropriate settlement (the facts) as opposedto the offers of
the parties has been assumed to be fixedand uninfluenced by the
quality of the offers. Themodel developed in earlier sections and
embodied in equationS 8 and 9 allow this weightto be a function of21
the quality of the offers. More specifically, the weight put on the
notion of an appropriate settlement (the facts) is hypothesize to be
a direct function of the difference between the offers of the parties.
As the offers of the parties diverge, perhaps through
"unreasonableness" on the part of one or both parties, it is
hypothesized that the arbitrator pays increased attention to the facts
and less attention to the offers.
The estimates of this nonlinear model, derived using NLLS, are
contained in the second column of Table 4. First note that the
estimates of the determinants of e are very close to those contained
in the first column and based on the linear model with fixed weights.
One minor (and welcome) change is that the coefficient on the level of
the present wage is not a significant determinant of the arbitrator's
notion of an appropriate wage increase.
With respect to the weights, the central hypothesis is strongly
consistent with the data. The weight that the arbitrator puts on the
notion of an appropriate award is estimated to be a direct function of
the difference between the offers. This hypothesis is imbedded in the
model as g1 <0,and the hypothesis that g1 =0can be rejected
against this alternative at any reasonable level of significance. In
addition, the hypothesis that if the offers of the parties do not
differ then the weight on the offers equals one cannot be rejected
This hypothesis is imbedded in the model as g0 =0,and this
hypothesis cannot be rejected at conventional levels of significance.
Another interesting result is that when the weights are allowed
to vary, the asymmetric treatment of the offers by the arbitrator
disappears. In the case where the weights were fixed the relative22
weight on the management offer (d) was estimated to be .753 with a
standard error of .055. When the quality of the offers is allowed to
influence the weight on the appropriate award (the facts), the
relative weight on the management offer is estimated to be .471 with a
standard error of .150. The hypothesis that the relative weights on
the management and union offers are equal (d=.5) cannot be rejected at
any reasonable level of significance. Thus, the evidence is
consistent with the notion that the arbitrators place equal emphasis
on the two offers but that the overall weight placed on the offers vis
a vis the facts is a function of the quality of the offers.
Table 5 contains estimates of the weight on the arbitrator's
notion of an appropriate awarS (the facts) for various values of the
difference between the offers of the parties.25 Approximations to the
standard errors are also included based on a first order approximation
to the weighting function derived in equation 9. Note first that the
value of the weight when the difference between the offers is zero is
not significantly different from zero. This value of the weight rises
rapidly with the difference between the offers. At the mean value of
the difference in the sample (.0675 or 6.75 percentage points) the
weight on the facts is fully 0.651. Thus, at the mean of the sample
the weight on the offers is only .349. As the difference between the
offers increases above the mean, the weight on the facts rises still
further. At two standard deviations above the mean (.122) over 80
percent of the weight is on the appropriate award and less than one
fifth is on the offers themselves.
Overall, the results provide strong evidence that arbitrators
consider both the exogenous facts of the case, perhaps in the context23
of Lheir notion of an appropriate award, and the offers of the parties
in formulating an award. In addition, the relative weight put on the
facts versus the offers depends heavily on the quality of the offers.
As the offers diverge, it was found that the arbitrators pay increased
attention to the facts and less attention to the divergent offers.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
Two simple (and admittedly extreme) models of the decision
process of arbitrators in conventional interest arbitration were
developed. The first was that the arbitrators evaluate the facts of a
case (as opposed to the offers of the parties) and make an award based
on what they deem fair. The second was that arbitrators make an award
based strictly on the offers of the parties (splits the difference)
without regard to the facts of the case. It was argued that these two
models are not likely to be good representations of the arbitrator
decision making process on a priori grounds. A more general model in
which the award is affected by both the facts of the case through both
the arbitrator's notion of an appropriate award and the offers of the
parties was then developed. In addition, the more general model
allowed the weight that the arbitrator put on the facts relative to
the offers to be a function of the quality of the offers.
The various models were implemented using data gathered from
practicing arbitrators regarding their decisions in twenty-five
hypothetical cases. These cases varied in a number of different
factual dimensions regarding the economic environment as well as in
the offers submitted by the two parties. On the basis of the
estimates, both of the simple models are strongly rejected. The
awards are influenced by both the facts of the case and the positions24
of the parties. In addition, when weight put on the facts of the case
is allowed to vary with the quality of the offers, it is found that
the arbitrator relies significantly more heavily on the facts and less
heavily on the offers when the offers are of low quality (far apart).
These results have a number of implications. First, the naive
split-the—difference view of arbitrator behavior, which is the basis
of the critique of conventional arbitration that has led to the
adoption of final-offer arbitration, is not correct in its extreme
view. The arbitrators are influenced by the facts independently of
the offers. In addition, the finding that the weight that the
arbitrator puts on the offers in making an award is affected by the
quality of the offers suggests that there are limits to the degree to
which the parties can manipulate the arbitration award by manipulating
their offers. For example, if the union's offer is extreme (high)
enough then a further increase in the union's offer may actually
decrease the arbitration award. Similarly, if the management's offers
is extreme (low) enough then a further decrease may actually increase
the arbitration award.
In order to illustrate this important result more clearly,
consider the following example. Suppose an arbitrator makes decisions
in a manner consistent with the nonlinear model defined in equations B
and 9, the estimates of which are contained in the second column of
Table 4. If the arbitrator's notion of an appropriate award (Ye)
based on the facts is 6 percent and the union and management offers
are fifteen percent and five percent respectively, then the computed
weight 0fl e is 0.781 and the weight on the offers is 1 —.781=.219.
The arbitration award will be (.781)6+(.219)((.471)5+(.529)15) 6.925
percent. However, if the union raised its offer to 20 percent,
admittedly an extreme figure, the weight on 1e would increase to .894
and the weight on the offers would fall to 1 —.894=.106.Overall,
the arbitration award would fall to (.894)6+(.106)((.471)5+(.529)20) =
6.7percent. Essentially, the increase in the union offer from 15
percent to twenty percent was more than offset by the decrease in the
weight that the arbitrator put on the offers (from .219 to .106).
Another implication of the analysis Is that the arbitrator cannot
be considered a judge who is free from influence by the parties.
Arbitration awards do seem to be manipulable within limits by the
parties through manipulation of their offers. A numerical example
based on the estimates is again useful to illustrate this point.
Consider now a situation similar to that described in the preceding
paragaraph with the exception that the union is offering ten percent.
In this case the weight that the arbitrator puts on the facts is .55
and the weight on the offers is .45. The arbitration award Is
(.55)6+(.45)((.471)5+(.529)10) =6.7percent. Thus, an increase in
the offer of the union from 10 percent to 15 percent would have the
benefit of increasing the arbitration award from 6.7 percent to 6.9
percent based on the computations in the preceding paragraph.In this
case the decrease in the weight on the offers from .45 to.219 was not
enough to offset the higher union offer.26
An important caveat is in order regarding the seriousnesswith
which to consider these particular illustrative calculations. Theydo
illustrate the algebra of the model and the constraint that the
decision rule of the arbitrator places on the parties, but they cannot
capture the full range of considerationsrelevant o the formulation26
of offersbythe parties. It is reasonable to expect the parties to
formulate their offers strategically with some understandingof how
they affect the arbitrationaward. However, it is not reasonable to
expect one party to hold itsoffer fixed as the other party makes its
offer more or less extreme in order to gain a strategic advantage.
Referring to the example in the previous paragraph, asthe union
raises its offer from 10 to 15 percent, it is better off onlyif the
management holds its offer at 5 percent.If the management drops its
offer to 2 percent as the union raises its offer, thenthe weight on
the facts rises to .858 and the weight on the offersfalls to .142.
The arbitration award falls to (.858)6+(.142)((.471)2÷(.529)15)
=5.1
percent, and the union is worse off. Clearly,it is important to
consider the mechanism through which the parties formulatetheir
offers. While no solution to this problem isoffered here, the
results derived in this study illustrate the influencethat the
decision rule of the arbitrator must have on the parties.27
Why the arbitrators do consider the offersin formulating their
awards is a complex question, and its answer lies beyondthe scope of
this study. Three possibilities are that the arbitrator mayconsider
the offers 1) in order to increase the acceptabilityof the award to
the parties, 2) in order to increase the likelihood or beinghired by
the parties in future cases, and 3) if itis felt thatthere is
information about the facts of the case in the offers thatis not
available to the arbitrator directly. This last is a particularly
difficult rationale to evaluate given that' the strategicbehavior on
the part of the parties that leads to the offerswill tend to make
such information unreliable if the partiesunderstand that the27
arbitrator is using the offers in formulating the award.
The advantages of using the decisions of arbitrators in carefully
controlled simulations as the basis of analysis in a study of this
type are clear. The major advantage is that the facts and offers in
each case are carefully controlled so that causal inference regarding
the relative weights of facts and offers on the arbitration award is
possible. This is not generally true of the necessarily incomplete
data gathered from actual arbitrations. On the other hand the
simulations suffer from the fact that the situations are artificial by
definition and that the arbitrator does not have the same range of
information available that is available in actual cases.28 Thus, it is
impossible to be sure that the judgements of arbitrators in simulated
cases are consistent with those they would make in actual cases.
Nonetheless, the internal consistency of the responses of the
arbitrators demonstrated in the analysis contained in this study
suggests that there is substantial information in these simulations
that can make a substantial contribution to understanding the behavior
of arbitrators.
Overall, •substantial progress has been made in analyzing the
decision processes of arbitrators in conventional arbitration. In
addition, the study has demonstrated the value of using data derived
from carefully designed simulations in analyzing the behavior of
arbitrators. A number of areas for further research are apparent.
For example, since the arbitrator decision process is likely to be
cen.tral to the process of collective bargaining where arbitration is
the dispute settlement mechanism, it would be useful to integrate the
results of studies such as this into theoretical and empirical28
analysis of bargaining in an environment that includes arbitration.
Finally, it is clear that arbitrators differ in their decision
processes, and it would be useful to investigate both the degreeto
which there are such differences and how these differences affect the
bargaining process.29
Notes
1) One exception to this is a recent study by Ashenfelter and
Bloom (1984) who use data from New Jersey in order to analyze the
outcomes of both conventional and final offer arbitration in the
context of one of the special case models developed below. A second
exception is Bazerman's (1983) analysis of idiosyncratic models of
arbitrator behavior.
2) Wheeler (1978) and Kochan and Baderschneider (1978) present
evidence regarding the diffusion of conventional arbitration schemes.
3) Feigenbaum (1975), Feulile (1975), Northrup (1966), Stevens
(1966), Starke and Notz (1981), Bonn (1972), and Anderson and Kochan
(1977) present arguments that arbitrators split the difference in
conventional arbitration resulting in a "chilling" of bargaining.
Farber (1981) presents a theoretical model with implications for the
pure split-the—difference model.
4) Throughout this study the "facts of the case" refer to all
considerations with the exception of the positions of the parties. In
general, the facts can be considered to be exogenous to the bargaining
process while the offers of the parties clearly cannot be.
5) Farber and Katz (1979) present a model of the bargaining
process where the arbitrator is assumed to impose a "fair" settlement
without regard to the positions of the parties.
6)Where there is more than one issue to be decided, the details
of the analysis become more complicated but its qualitative nature is
unchanged for the purposes of this study.
7) See Farber and Katz (1979) for an analysis of the implications
of this simple decision rule for the collective.bargaining process.30
8) Note that the simple split the diffrence model contained in
equation 2 is a special case of the more general model where d1/2.
9) See the references in note 3.
10) Note that a concern for workability of an award also suggests
that the facts of a case be considered so that the arbitrator is
cognizant of important economic and political factors.
11) This is related to the argument that the arbitrator would
like to find a workable settlement. If an unworkable settlement is
imposed then one side or the other would not want to hire the
arbitrator again.
12) Farber (1981) develops the implications for the collective
bargaining process of arbitrators considering the positions of the
parties and making judgements as to their reasonableness.
13) Another model of the arbitrator decision process is based on
the notion that the arbitrator is constrained to make an award that
lies between the offers of the parties so that the result is always
some sort of compromise. In this case the award can be interpreted as
a weighted average of the offers of the parties where the weight
depends on how the arbitrator evaluates each offer in comparison to
some notion of an appropriate settlement. The more reasonable offer
would receive a higher weight. The implications of this model are
very similar to those of the model described in the text.When the
offers are close together, the arbitrator has little discretion in
fashioning a compromise. However, when the offers are far apart, the
arbitrator has much more discretion in making what is felt to be a
reasonable award.
14) The mean charcteristics of the respondents are based on the31
fifty—six of the fifty-nine arbitrators who provided theirpersonal
characteristics along with their judgements.
15) This particular design was adopted for tFe purposes of other
research using the same data. See Bazerman (1983).
16) Farber and Katz (1979) and Farber (1981) develop models of
the collecitve bargaining process where the uncertainty createdby
arbitration is central to its operation as a dispute
settlement mechanism.
17) Virtually identical empirical results would be derived were
the exact proportional differences used rather than the log
differences.
18) Bazerman (1983) presents an analysis of differences between
arbitrators in the formulation of their awards under conventional
arbitration.
19) Of course, there is no single constant in a fixed effect
model. The analysis of errors components models in this context is
formally identical to the well known seemingly—unrelated-regression
problem.
20) Note that these considerations are independent of whether, in
fact, the constant terms differ significantly across arbitrators.
They only suggest that the estimation and statistical inference
regarding the basic variables will be unchanged. In fact, for the
models presented below, the hypothesis that the constants are the same
for all arbitrators can be rejected marginally at conventional levels
using an F-test in the OLS models arid using a likelihood ratio test
under the hypothesis of normally distributed errors in the NLLS model.
21) In formal terms, this hypothesis is that the sum of the32
coefficients on CONDE and CONDG equals zero. The estimated sum of
these coefficients is .00807 with a standard error of .00243.
22) The difference between the coefficient on MFO and the
coefficient on UFO is estimated to be .186 with a standard error of
0.0419.
23) This is the hypothesis that the coeeficients on both MFO and
UFO are zero. The appropriate test statistic is 64.25 which is
distributed as F(2, 1465). The critical value of this distribution at
the .01 level of significance is 4.61.
24) This is the hypothesis that the coeeficients on the seven
variables in X are zero. The appropriate test statistic is 104.82
which is distributed as F(7, 1465). The critical value of this
distribution at the .01 level of significance is 2.64.
25) The values chosen for the differential include the extreme
values 0 and .2 along with the mean value plus and minus zero, one,
and two standard deviations. The mean plus and minus two standard
deviations covers the observed range of the difference in offers
almost exactly. The minimum value in the sample is .0135, and the
mean minus two standard deviations is .0133. The maximum value in the
sample is .121 and the mean plus two standard deviations is .122.
26) The union will always be better off making its offer larger
as long as dY +(l-d)Y<Y.Given that the estimate of d is close
to .5, this statement is close to the statement that the union will
always be better off with a higher offer as long as its offer is
closer to Ye than is the management offer. An analogous result holds
for the management offer. Of course, these results are true only if
the offer of the other party is fixed.33
27) See Farber (1981) for an analysis of strategic behavior by
the parties in formulating their offers in the context of a model
similar to that implemented in this study.
28) Bazerman (1983) discusses informal responses from arbitrators
who examined the simulations with regard to the lack of detailed
information on each case relativ.e to what they see in actual cases.34
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Means and standard deviations of the percent. wage increase
awarded by the fifty-nine arbitrators in each of the scenarios.




2 7.18 15 9.56
(1.53) (2.64)
3 7.10 16 7.86
(1.53) (2.02)
4 12.06 17 7.08
(1.28) (1.69)
5 11.19 18 7.94
(2.14) (2.11)
6 10.34 19 8.95
(1.10) (1.45)
7 8.66 20 12.43
(1.88) (1.43)
8 12.84 21 11.49
(2.70) (1.76)
9 10.14 22 12.25
(1.89) (2.28)
10 13.38 23 10.81
(1.58) (1.88)
11 11.85 24 10.61
(1.54) (2.02)
12 8.17 25 13.45
(1.40) (2.67)
13 9.63




log of present wage 2.19
(.393)
log diff between award and PW .0964
(.0246)
INF inflation rate .110
(.0283)
COMP comparable arbitrated settlements .110
(.0283)
LW log diff between local wage and PW .0103
(.101)
NW log diff between national wage and PW .00524
(.0214)
CONDB =1 if company in terrible or poor shape .400
CONDG =1 if company in good or excellent shape .400
MFO logdiff between man, final offer and PW .0728
(.0291)
UFO log diff between union final offer and PW .140
(.0282)
AFO log diff between ave. final offer and PW .107
(.0253)
DFO log difference between final offers .0676
(.0271)
N=1475 (59 arbitrators x 25 scenarios)Table 3:
Estimates of OLS Models of Arbitrator Decisions
Dependent Variable =
variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant .0353 .0495 .0563 .0184





















R—SQUARED .430 .202 .214 .476
ln(L) 3787.6 3539.0 3550.1 3849.6
Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The log-
likelihood values are based on a normal distribution for the errors.
N= 1475Table 4:
Estimates of Explicit Models of Arbitrator Decisions
Dependent Variable =Y
Variable Transformed OLS NLLS





























Note: The numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. The
transformed OLS estimates are based on the estimates contained in the
fourth column of Table 3, and its standard errors are derived from a
first order approximation to the relevant nonlinear transformation of
the OLS parameters. The nonlinear model is defined in equations 8 and
9. The log—likelihood values are based on a normal distribution for
the errors. N=1475.Table 5:
Estimates of weight on arbitrator's notion of equitable award
as a function of log difference in offers
(DIFF =MFO-UFO)
(AVE =averagevalue of DIFF =.0675)
(sd =standarddeviation of DIFF =.0271)




AVE —2sd .0133 .238
(.0616)










Note: The numbers in parentheses are aproximate asymptotic standard
errors. They are derived from a first order approximation to the
nonlinear transformation of the parameters contained in equation 9.
The estimates used are contained inthesecond columnof Table4.